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Summary 
 
Gambling is now a large revenue source for many governments, due to its ease of implementation, 
popular appeal and high real tax rate it can bear (up to around 40%). It is often promoted by spending 
on “good causes” designated as “additional” to existing government activity. These effectively 
hypothecated gambling taxes (specifically designated rather than fed into the general tax pool) are 
often, however, diverted into education, health, and social and economic development, potentially 
substituting for taxation raised elsewhere in the economy. There is also evidence that gambling’s 
taxation implications (against income) are doubly regressive, taking disproportionately from lower 
income groups and giving to those better off. This study utilises two cases: the UK’s National Lottery 
Scheme, and the effects of Electronic Gaming Machine (EGM) proliferation in a low socio-economic 
region (Logan), of Queensland Australia, in order to illustrate that, despite different contexts, scales, 
and gambling vehicles, the general distributional issues of cost and benefit exist in the two jurisdictions 
and as a result can also have geographically disproportionate impacts.  
 
Introduction 
 
Gambling is now a significant revenue earner for many western federal and state governments, due to 
its relative ease of implementation, popularity and high real tax rates upon it (up to around 40%). In the 
UK, for example, in 2001-2 figures derived from National Lottery Commission (2002) show tax 
revenues of around £580m from sales of lottery products. In Queensland, Australia in 2001-2 $567m 
was raised in gambling related taxes, nearly 12% of all state government tax revenue (Queensland 
Treasury, 2003).  The comparison is interesting because the debates concerning gambling are in some 
ways more advanced in Australia, the scale of gambling tax revenue in Queensland highlights 
distributional questions more starkly, and as a result the relevant accompanying data concerning 
gambling revenue raised and how it is spent is also available. 
 
The introduction of state-sponsored gambling is also often accompanied by spending on “good causes”, 
funded by some of the revenue generated from the gambling activity. These “good causes” funds are 
effectively, therefore, generated from hypothecated taxes on gambling, a feature actively promoted in 
the marketing of these activities. Such hypothecation can also be seen as an implicit acknowledgement 
of the need to mitigate some of the adverse socio-economic impacts of gambling, though Camelot’s 
(2003) social report states that their aim is to maximise the returns to good causes in a socially 
responsible way. In the UK, the National Lottery spends around 28% of its revenue on “good causes”, 
whilst in Queensland nearly $35m per annum is now redistributed from the taxes raised in a 
“Community Benefit Fund” (CBF). In most cases these schemes begin by spending on projects 
designated as “additional” to existing government activity (i.e. would not have taken place without the 
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gambling derived revenues). Often, however, over time at least a proportion of the funds are diverted 
into areas within the remit of government taxation, particularly education, but also including health and 
social and economic development, raising the prospect that gambling-related lottery funding substitutes 
for taxation elsewhere in the economy.  
 
Bailey (1995) argued that the UK’s National Lottery would lead to a shift in public expenditure 
towards a narrow range of projects (often ranking low compared with health and education), and for the 
need for periodic reviews of the sources and uses of such revenues. This research also raises important 
policy issues in the public management of such funds, particularly in the case of the UK, where recent 
changes in the designation of “good cause” (DCMC, 2003b) have caused greater overlap with areas in 
public spending such as health and education, just as Bailey (1995) advocated, with a third of the 
money now to be designated for “health, education and the environment”, the remainder split equally 
between sport, art, heritage, and charities. 
 
This paper therefore undertakes a review of the UK situation, but widens the scope to include a 
geographic analysis of the costs and benefits, as well as exploring the impact of Electronic Gaming 
Machine (EGM) proliferation in a low-socio-economic areas of Queensland Australia (Logan), where 
specific concerns had been raised. This approach emphasises the seemingly systematic nature of the 
disproportional effects occurring through gambling-related revenue raising and use patterns. The 
purpose of the case studies is not therefore to compare the specific effects of the gambling type (see 
Worthington et al (2003) for example, for a full examination of this aspect in the Australian context) or 
application-based fund-distribution mechanisms (though both of these are important research 
questions), but rather to examine the general nature of the public taxation and expenditure issues at 
different levels (nation-region-locality). 
 
The next section of the paper examines the broad literature concerning the social and economic effects 
of gambling, particularly in terms of taxation and where the benefits of gambling-funded programmes 
accrue. The UK Lottery is then examined in terms of these issues and how this impacts 
disproportionately on poorer regions. The paper also analyses revenue raising and spending effects of 
EGM’s in Logan. The final section draws conclusions regarding the specific public expenditure issues 
related to gambling and their potential knock-on effects. 
 
The Tax and Spending Implications of Gambling 
 
Increased gambling activity, as well as raising taxation revenue directly, can also reduce taxation 
revenue from other, existing, sources. In the UK, for example, the Lottery has reduced the amount 
spent on traditional football pools, which had been taxed at 37.5% of turnover (Moore, 1994). In view 
of this the UK National Lottery is officially taxed at 12%. With the 28% of total revenue that the good 
causes receives (Bailey, 1995), along with effects from VAT and unclaimed prizes, the “real” taxation 
rate can be seen as up to around 40%. This, however, also depends on which of the good causes funds 
one classifies as undertaking activities that would otherwise ultimately require taxation-funded 
government expenditure. For example, only designating health, education and environment under this 
heading (33.3% of good cause spending) would reduce the “real” tax rate to nearer 22%.  
 
It can also be argued that lottery-generated transactions could further increase taxation revenues 
through the spending of lottery prizes, retailer commission and operating costs payments. Borg and 
Mason (1993), however, also found that, in the USA, states without a state income tax, but with high 
sales and excise taxes, lost substantial non-lottery tax- revenue as a result of instituting a lottery, as 
high as 23% of the government’s lottery proceeds. Additionally it was found that the resultant reduced 
spending on private sector goods could mean reduced future investment, further reducing future tax 
revenue. They therefore concluded that lotteries were neither an efficient nor equitable substitute for 
more traditional tax sources (Borg and Mason, 1993).  
 
Governments also often claim that any lottery “tax” paid is voluntary. However, Heberling (2002) 
argues that whilst in the USA state legislators view the lottery as a “voluntary tax” that releases tax 
revenue for other uses, in reality it is highly regressive and should be seen in the same light as any other 
sales tax in terms of its voluntary nature.  Many studies also show the regressive nature of gambling 
spending generally and hence that its taxation implications (against income) are also regressive. In 
terms of EGM’s, Layton and Worthington (1999) cite previous work (Madhusudhan, 1996; Rivenbark 
and Roonsaville, 1996; Szakmary and Szakamary, 1995) as evidence that ‘the pattern of expenditure 
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may work to the relative detriment of low income individuals and deepen the economic problems that 
must be addressed by other public support programs’ (p. 430). Their study found support for this 
contention when they addressed the impact of socio- economic factors on gambling expenditure, using 
a sample of 8,389 Australian households in 1993-1994. In addition, recipients of aged and veteran-
affairs payments have greater probability of being a gambling household (with the exception of casino 
type games), whilst receipt of unemployment benefit had a positive impact on the probability of using 
Lotto and poker machine gambling. In addition, households where the reference head has a ‘blue 
collar’ occupation had a higher probability of poker machine gambling,  
 
In the case of lotteries, Price and Novak’s (1999) analysis of Texas lottery games found them all to be 
highly regressive in income terms.  Clotfelter and Cook (2001) found that US state lotteries were both 
an implicit tax and regressive in the 1970’s and 1980s’, as well as being highly concentrated on the 
African American minority. Stranahan and Borg (1998) also found that African Americans and 
individuals with the lowest educational attainment bore a significantly higher lottery tax burden. 
 
This regressivity, however, can also be seen in terms of where the money is spent. Moore (1994) points 
out that during the second reading of the Act creating the UK’s National Lottery, there was very little 
discussion of the merits or demerits of the lottery as a means of raising funds. Several Lords (Donaghue 
and Houghton) noted the US evidence of the regressive nature of lottery revenue-raising against 
income, and expressed fears that funds would be distributed disproportionately to projects in the capital 
and other prosperous regions, rather than evenly across the country as a whole. Given that governments 
(directly or indirectly) control spending decisions, it would seem logical that they use the hypothecated 
element of funds generated from gambling (e.g. the 28% of lottery spend that go to “good causes” in 
the UK) in ways that at least benefit proportionately the lower-income and minority groups and regions 
generating the funds in the first place. However, the existing evidence does not suggest this as a likely 
outcome. 
 
Rubenstein and Scafidi (2002), for example, found that the Georgia lottery for education was regressive 
in terms of its implicit taxation, and that ethnic minorities spent significantly more on the lottery. 
However, in addition higher income households received higher levels of benefit from the lottery-
funded programmes than lower income households, caused by the patterns of spending on lottery 
products and the higher education level of the scholarships that it was funding. The benefits of such 
spending depend on the designation of eligible programmes, and the rules governing application. Borg 
and Mason (2001) found, in the case of an Illinois lottery to support education, that it caused 
displacement of other funds rather than addition to them. They concluded that lotteries designed to 
support education in reality do not (because of displacement), and that the excise tax inherent in the 
lottery itself was both a very inefficient and very regressive way of paying for such education spending. 
In the US education system, either lottery-funded grants tend to go to higher socio-economic groups or 
there is an expenditure displacement effect allowing lower taxes than would otherwise have been the 
case, disproportionately benefiting the better-off.  
 
In the UK, Bailey (1995) argued that there has been little debate on what constituted “good causes” 
though he noted that the 1994 British Social Attitudes survey found preferences for increased spending 
to be heavily skewed towards health, education, pensions and the police, rather than arts and culture, 
which were seen as the preserve of affluent groups. Indeed, whilst 1 in 7 of the middle classes were 
found to want more spending on arts and culture, this only applied to 1 in 20 of working class 
respondents. In addition, Bailey (1995) argued that since the lottery funds only respond to applications, 
the system tended to favour eloquent, organised middle class groups at the expense of poorer groups 
and areas. Overall, he concluded that the system was likely to lead to self-interested lobbying rather 
than public accountability. 
 
Bailey and Connolly (1997) note that legislation insists that lottery grants must be additional to existing 
government funding and that this is usually taken to mean the use of lottery revenues to fund spending 
that would otherwise not have taken place. Bailey (1995) argued that the restriction of lottery funding 
to capital projects was likely to skew local authority expenditure away from other public sector 
services. However, there is still the possibility that lottery funds may substitute for government 
spending to allow increased spending in other areas (indirect net additionality) or to completely 
substitute for spending (displacement), hence allowing taxes to be lower than they would otherwise be. 
This is most likely in areas of existing government spending i.e. sports, arts, heritage, health and 
education. 
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Oakley and Green (2001) argue that the lottery funding has become increasingly selective, and more 
generally that the new lottery Community Fund has been heavily influenced by the government’s social 
exclusion agenda. Bailey (1995) and Bailey and Connolly (1997) also note that Local Authorities must 
usually match the lottery funds to some extent before they can access them. Recent budget cuts are 
likely to mean that lottery money actually allows some shifting of resources to other programme 
budgets, reducing the real direct net additionality. White (1999) also notes that local authority grants to 
upgrade leisure facilities were often seen as displacing existing funds. This situation worsened after the 
creation of the sixth good cause, (health, education and the environment), which both reduced funds to 
the other good causes and, with local authority reorganisation, increased the fear that the lottery was in 
substitution for at least some public spending, rather than in addition to it.  
 
There are also economic development issues involved in the distribution of lottery spending. Virtually 
any spending will have an effect on economic development within a region, as Auyer (1995) 
highlighted in the case of Oregon. The financial resources made available can be substantial relative to 
existing funds. In the case of the UK’s National Lottery for example, Bailey (1995) calculated in 1995 
that the annual £1.1bn per annum designated for good causes was almost equal to the government’s 
£1.3bn Single Regeneration Budget for social development, or equivalent to 0.76 pence on the basic 
rate of income tax.  
 
This brief review of the literature in relation to the economic effects of gambling can be summarised in 
terms of four assertions:- 
• That gambling taxes are relatively high and far more regressive than general sales taxes because 
low socio-economic groups are more likely to gamble than high income groups. 
• That specific funds for “good causes” from lottery-derived revenue tend to benefit better-off 
groups because of the regulations determining spending. 
• That spending of lottery funding on existing areas of government is likely to generate substitution 
rather than additional resources 
• That there are potentially different geographic effects generated by the source and destination of 
gambling revenues, taxes and subsequent spending, both because of the socio-economic 
characteristics of gamblers, and because of the rules, regulations and practices regarding where and 
on what “good cause” spending is undertaken. 
 
This literature and these assertions then provide the context for the detailed analysis of the two case 
studies, that of the UK’s National Lottery scheme and the effects of EGMs in Queensland, Australia. 
 
The UK National Lottery 
 
Until the latest review (DCMS, 2003b) there were six “Good Causes” to which UK National Lottery 
money went. These are administered by the Arts Councils, Sports Councils, Heritage Fund, Millennium 
Commission (now ceasing to control additional funds) and the newly merged Community (charities) 
and New Opportunities (education, health and environment) Funds (DCMS, 2003a). Latest Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport (2003b) figures show that of the £12.9bn spent by April 2003, 16.3% had 
gone to the Arts, 15.1 % to Sport, 17.7% to Heritage, 15.3% to Millennium projects, 20% to Charities 
and 15.5% to the New Opportunities Fund.  
 
The last 3 Funds are now being merged into one, with control of over 50% of the money raised by the 
Lottery for good causes in future (DCMS, 2003b). This new arrangement will be focused on 
“streamlined and easy access to funding” for community transformation and innovation, through both 
small and large projects. In addition, there will be different types of funding on offer under this new 
“mega-fund”, to add to those already available through arts, heritage and sport. DCMS (2003b) 
summarises these as “open grants” (demand-led for community and voluntary groups); “national 
programme funding” (government-agreed targets for projects where applications may be invited or 
resources allocated); “transformation grants” (for projects of national significance); “Young People’s 
Fund”; “Awards for all” and “Micro grants” (under £500) in England. A new “Olympic bid” funding 
stream is also being introduced. In addition, the UK government will devolve power to the National 
Assemblies and Parliaments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland for setting priorities and 
strategies for their areas. These changes can be seen as a response to earlier criticisms of priorities that 
did not match the public view, as expounded by Bailey (1995). 
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In the DCMS (2002a) publication “Lottery Funding: first 7 years”, funding is shown as allocated either 
to individual regions of England and non-English nations of the UK, or allocated to England, England 
and Wales, Great Britain, or UK wide. This has led to the need to calculate a total figure that makes the 
assumption that any resources for programmes covering a number of regions are allocated on a simple 
per-capita basis. This can then be expressed as a simple total (in column 2), and as an index against the 
UK average per capita (column 6 of table 1). These figures can then be assessed relative to average 
gross income per head (derived from Regional Trends and shown as an index in column 3 of table 1), 
and to spending each week on the lottery against the UK average (columns 4 and 5). In each case an 
index is generated (with the UK being the average and having an index value of 1) In addition, two 
composite indexes that integrate spending on the lottery within regions and grants received from the 
lottery in these regions are also generated (columns 7 and 8). Results are shown in table 1 below.  
(Table 1 Here) 
 
To briefly explain the results in the table, the simple index of lottery expenditure (column 4) is above 1 
where spend per person on the Lottery is above what one would expect on an equal per capita, or per 
household, basis. The lottery spend adjusted for income (column 5) divides the simple lottery spend by 
the index for average gross income (column 3) and thus this index is above 1 where spend per person is 
above what one would expect on an equal per capita and average income basis. The indexes of lottery 
expenditure against grant (columns 7 and 8) are below one where the region essentially "gains overall" 
(acknowledging that lottery spend amounts are above those given back, as only 28% of lottery revenues 
go to good causes). Column 7 looks at the simple index of lottery expenditure divided by the index of 
lottery grants. The final column essentially makes an adjustment of this by the index of average gross 
income, in practice dividing the index of lottery expenditure adjusted for relative income by the index 
of lottery grants.  
 
Essentially, the tables show a broadly regressive relationship between expenditure on the lottery and 
average gross income in the regions, whereby the poorer regions in terms of income per head spend 
higher than average amounts on the lottery, both in absolute terms and relative to their incomes. In 
comparison, the richer regions such as East London, the South East, and South West spend less 
absolutely on the Lottery, and relative to their incomes. In terms of the relative gainers in lottery 
expenditure, London stands out (perhaps unsurprisingly), as does the South West of England, Northern 
Ireland, the North East of England, Scotland, and Wales. Taking expenditure and spending into 
account, these are also the areas that derive most overall benefit. When one looks, however, at this 
relative to income, the advantage disappears for Wales and the North East of England, and drops for 
Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the South West of England. London remains the major gainer, 
precisely as the Lords predicted, with Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the South West of England also 
as relative gainers, and other areas as relative losers (compared to their lottery expenditures). Whilst the 
newly combined “mega Fund” may help to redress this because of the high proportion of resources 
commanded and its focus on social and economic inclusion, there will still be some need to avoid the 
problems highlighted by Bailey (1995) of self-interested lobbying rather than public accountability, and 
an applications-based system that may favour eloquent, organised middle class groups at the expense of 
poorer groups and areas. Indeed, DCMS (2003b) acknowledges this very issue, though time will tell as 
to the effectiveness of any new streamlined grant-applications procedures.  
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Electronic Gaming Machines, Logan and Queensland 1999-2000 
 
These issues are, if anything, of even more importance in Australia, where the gambling industry has 
grown significantly over the last three decades. During this time there has been a fourfold increase in 
real gambling turnover, now more than $95 billion, in real gambling expenditure, currently some $821 
per person, and in government revenue, at present accounting for some $3,850 million in gambling-
related taxation or about 10 percent of State government revenues. With $871.3 million gross taxation 
revenue generated from gaming machines alone in Queensland (and only about $35m specifically 
returned through the Community Benefit Fund), the State Government’s interest is not unfounded 
(QOGR Annual Report 1999/2000). The reasons for exploration of the impacts of EGMs in a low 
socio-economic area (such as Logan) are provided by the Queensland Office of Gaming Regulation 
(QOGR) in their (1999) Review of Gaming in Queensland.  They noted an increased public backlash 
against uncontrolled EGM growth with submissions from community groups such as BreakEven, and 
local Governments such as Logan City Council. According to Queenslands’ Office of Economic and 
Statistical Research (2003), the local Government Area of Logan has the following characteristics: 
• 168,000 inhabitants, 4.6% of the Queensland total 
• Relative concentrations in manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trades, and 
tradespersons, intermediate and elementary workers and labourers 
• An unemployment rate of 10.1% compared to 8.1% for Queensland as a whole 
• Disproportionately high numbers without post-school educational qualifications 
 
Logan is therefore characterised as a relatively less well-off socio-economic area. Given previous 
evidence, therefore, it would be perhaps unsurprising if Logan is losing out relatively from gambling, 
in overall cost and benefit terms, from the tax revenue raised and community benefit funds spent in 
Logan. The table below sets out estimates of relative tax raising (costs) and community benefit funds 
(benefits) within the area of Logan compared to Queensland as a whole. 
 
(Table 2 Here) 
 
Essentially table two shows that, for Logan compared with Queensland, as generally, the taxes on 
gambling are regressive in relation to socio-economic status and income (with Logan generating 117% 
of the gambling revenues to government than would be justified by its population alone, and 125% 
when income is factored in), and that the area does not receive the benefits from the gambling fund that 
would be justified by its population (only 76% of those justified by its proportion of the population), let 
alone its contribution to the gambling revenues that produced the gambling fund in the first place. 
Figures related to applications for Community Benefit Funds (CBF) monies (derived from the annual 
reports of the Queensland Community Benefit Fund) show that : 
• In Logan for 1993-2003, the average grant obtained was $9,954, compared with $9,149 for 
Queensland as a whole. 
• Logan had 3.3% of total applications but 3.5% of total spend from the CBF, compared with its 
4.6% of the Queensland population 
Table 2 indicates in the final two columns (7 and 8), the combined effects of this “over payment” into 
gambling-related revenues and “under payment” of community benefit grants, in pure per capita terms 
(column 7) and then factoring in income levels (column 8).  
 
These results for Logan can thus be seen as fitting in with the UK National Lottery data, but also other 
statistical research for Australia in general and Queensland in particular. Recent research (from the 
most recent Australian Household Expenditure Survey) by Worthington et al (2003) examined several 
different types of betting behaviour (including lotteries and EGM machines) and the factors that impact 
upon them. This study indicated that the overall incidence of gambling-related taxation is only mildly 
regressive with respect to income and was only a statistically significant relationship with on course 
betting. However, the research also revealed that factors other than income level (but which do impact 
on income) are also at play in determining gambling expenditures. Rather than the level of income 
itself it is its primary source, whether salaries and wages, self-employment, investments and 
superannuation, or pensions and other government benefits, that was found to be important. In addition, 
for EGM machines, socio-economic status was also found to be important in explaining gambling 
behaviour, with low socio-economic status related to higher expenditure on EGMs. This can be seen as 
impacting on the socio-economic status of Logan, which in table 2 we have crudely approximated 
through income levels. 
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Regression results in Brown et al (2003) also indicate that, at the Local Government Authority area 
level across Queensland as a whole, with “average EGM metered win per adult” as the dependent 
variable, as well as “approved EGMs per 10,000 adults” and “average number of EGMs per site” being 
positive strong and statistically significant explanatory variables (at the 5% level), per capita taxable 
income was  also found to be a slightly negative explanatory variable (as would be predicted by the 
regressive relationship with gambling outlined in the literature) and significant at the 10% level. 
 
Whilst Logan can therefore be seen as fitting in with the general trend in the literature, data from Logan 
does provide additional some additional evidence from the grant-giving process. Examination of the 
Gambling Community Benefit Fund website (http://www.gcbf.qld.gov.au/html/about.html) revealed 
that the fund operates via allocation of one-off applied-for grants (of up to $30,000) to approved non-
profit organisations, for activities or services that can demonstrably benefit the Community and 
Queensland. There are four funding rounds per year, via completion of a funding application package, 
and approval from an “independent” community-based committee appointed on a 3 year basis.  
 
Statistics in table 2 show Logan to be relatively poor at terms of making successful applications.  This 
may be, at least partly because of the nature of the applications process relative to the capacity of those 
making them, a problem Bailey (1995) pointed out for the UK lottery, (though successful grant 
applications were for relatively large amounts). Some statistical examination of the 12 postal coded 
areas in Logan obtaining CBF money was possible. This data indicated a strong negative correlation 
between the wealth of the postcode (as indicated by average house prices) and the CBF money per head 
it was generating (of -0.49, significant at the 5% 1-tailed level), showing that poorer areas were 
benefiting relative to richer ones. This relationship became much weaker (-0.146 and insignificant), 
however, when the central administrative area of Logan (which is more able to draw in outside 
administrative expertise), the poorest in terms of house prices and the strongest in terms of obtaining 
CBF money, was excluded. There was also a much stronger positive relationship between total grants 
awarded and pure size of population in the area (0.87, significant at 1% level). Superficial visual 
analysis of the groups obtaining grants also suggested that “professional” community organisations 
were predominant in their ability to obtain funding. This implies that although the money was being 
generally allocated according to population, the way in which the CBF is administered is detrimental to 
certain groupings without the expertise necessary to fill in the forms or manage the application process.  
 
Conclusions and Implications for Public Expenditure 
 
The outstanding common feature of both cases is the regressive nature of tax receipts and subsequent 
spending against income at the geographic level. Both the UK National Lottery and Queensland’s 
EGMs can be seen to take disproportionately from less well-off areas, whilst gambling-revenue related 
spending is concentrated disproportionately on better-off ones, possibly partly related to the 
application-based nature of the systems in both the UK and Queensland. This paper thus adds UK and 
Australian geographically-based examples to the evidence in the literature from the United States 
concerning the hypothecated spending of gambling-related revenues, suggesting that there may be 
common features of general state-sponsored gambling systems. Great care and effort is needed to 
overcome these regressive features, particularly in the area of spending distribution, the facet most 
amenable to political control. This paper suggests at the very least, that more research needs to be 
undertaken into the effects of grant-distribution mechanisms on the impacts of gambling funded 
projects (the latest changes in the UK being monitored for example). More radically there may be the 
need to consider a different approach to the geographic distribution of gambling generated revenues, 
more directly related to local need, in order that issues of community harm and benefit from gambling 
can be more effectively addressed. 
 
In the UK this may form part of a wider debate over fiscal funding and devolution. National Lottery 
derived funds do not come within the remit of the Barnett formula, which determines the level of fiscal 
“block grants” for primary government services that are received by England. Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. The UK’s Barnett formula (introduced in 1979) was designed to relate incremental 
changes in expenditure in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to the expenditure margins which 
existed in 1979 between these countries and England. The formula operates by allocating a constant 
proportion of every increase in public spending in England to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – 
this ratio being roughly based on the ratio of each country’s population to the population of England.  
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However, although the government proposes devolving some lottery priority-setting to Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland’s national political institutions, DCMS (2003b) clearly states that the devolved 
institutions do not have any control over the allocation of resources between themselves and the rest of 
the UK. In reality, the National Lottery generates resources in the same way as other taxes but is not 
subject to, (in the case of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), the formal Barnett formula 
arrangements of the Treasury, instead fulfilling a de facto “formula by-pass role”, whereby spending 
decisions are determined by the grant-giving criteria. DCMS (2003b) argues that the role of the 
National Lottery is to be “additional” to government spending. However, the new mega-fund 
encroaches on areas such as health and education where this distinction can be blurred at best, and 
where the aims of the fund in community development and social exclusion may make the situation 
even more complex. 
 
Another way in which gambling-related resources could be channelled is through regional economic 
development activities (widely defined), with resources allocated according to need, defined for 
example by GDP per head. This type of formulation is particularly important not just because of the 
relatively significant sums that can be produced for economic development, but also because of the 
reality that the poorest regions/nations will have the greatest need for economic development resources, 
which cannot be guaranteed by the present lottery funding regime, or by a Barnett-type formula (see 
Bristow and Blewitt, 1999), not least because Barnett would not deal with disparities between English 
regions. 
 
In the case of Queensland, because the vast majority of the government funds generated by gambling 
are already brought within the remit of general taxation-funded spending, there is a much stronger 
argument that those areas generating gambling-related taxation revenue benefit through receiving 
taxation-funded expenditures. In Australia there are also strong mechanisms in place to try and ensure 
that fiscal resources are allocated according to need, to ensure horizontal fiscal equalisation (Dollery 
and Worthington, 1996).  
 
Another way to look at generally income-regressive gambling taxes, however, is the opportunity cost 
approach i.e. if the taxation revenue were not raised from gambling, where would this funding come 
from? American studies cited earlier indicated that gambling generated revenue substitutes for higher 
taxes on higher socio-economic groups. Therefore gambling taxation-funded services in poorer areas 
are substituting for ones being paid for by richer groups. Essentially, instead of the rich paying for the 
poor, the poor are paying for their own government spending, alleviating the burden on the rich. Given 
the relatively large proportion of Queensland’s state taxes raised through gambling, this is likely to be 
both a significant problem and, simultaneously, one that it is now very difficult to alter. In some ways 
this situation is similar to that for tobacco and alcohol taxes in particular, and sales taxes in general. 
What is different is that there is a partial hypothecation to the spending of gambling revenue, via the 
Community Benefit Fund in the case of Queensland. The Community Benefit Fund expenditures are, 
therefore important, even though they use a relatively small proportion of the total revenues to 
government generated from EGM’s, because they are the most visible use of the resources generated.  
 
Because of the potentially discriminatory nature of the applications process for the Community Benefit 
Fund, it may be more effective to channel the remaining monies to elected bodies such as Local 
Government Authorities, in the form of an “Economic Benefit Fund”, for spending on economic 
development measures designed to improve the local areas’ future prospects. This would allow the 
large number of small grants to be pooled into more significant projects. During the period 1993-2003, 
over $A6m dollars were distributed from EGM-generated revenue in the Logan area, an amount that 
would have been over $A8m if population size had been the funding criterion and over $A9.3m if the 
generation of the taxation revenue had been used instead. In 2001-2 (the last year for which annual 
figures are available), the $1.3m actually received from the Community Benefit Fund would have risen 
to more than $1.6m or to nearly $1.9m depending on the criterion used. Given that Logan City Council 
(2003) planned to spend only $815,000 on economic development projects, $1.9m represents a sizable 
additional resource.  
 
Gambling currently provides a base for hypothecated taxation in many countries around the world. The 
evidence presented in this paper indicates that geographically disparate costs are also imposed through 
the operations of gambling. Thus a geographically-based policy for utilising the resources may also be 
valid.  
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Table 1 National Lottery Revenue and Expenditure per Region-(with unspecific allocated on equal per 
Person basis) Per Person 
1: Region 2 : 
Total  
Lottery 
Grants 
(£m) 
3 : Index 
of average 
gross 
income 
per person 
1997-
2000 (UK 
=1) 
4 : Index 
of Lottery 
Expenditu
re per 
person 
1997-
2000 (UK 
=1)  
5 : Index 
Adjusted 
for 
relative 
income 
Index of 
Lottery 
Expenditu
re per 
person 
1997-
2000 (UK 
=1)  
 6 : Index of 
National 
Lottery 
Grant per 
person (UK 
=1) 
7 : 
Index 
of 
Lottery 
expend
iture 
against 
Grant 
(person
) (UK 
=1) (1) 
8 : Index 
of income 
adjusted 
lottery 
expenditu
re against 
Grant 
(person) 
(UK =1) 
(1) 
UK 9675.02 1 1 1 1 1 1 
North East 525.59 0.84 1.22 1.45 1.25 0.97 1.16 
North West 1107.50 0.91 1.07 1.18 0.99 1.08 1.19 
Yorkshire 
and Humber 
736.74 0.87 1.11 1.29 0.90 1.24 1.43 
East 
Midlands 
514.76 0.95 1.05 1.11 0.76 1.39 1.47 
West 
Midlands 
766.77 0.93 1.11 1.20 0.88 1.26 1.36 
East 643.38 1.08 0.91 0.85 0.73 1.25 1.16 
London 1808.91 1.27 0.86 0.68 1.53 0.56 0.44 
South East 920.85 1.21 0.97 0.80 0.70 1.39 1.14 
South West 738.09 0.96 0.80 0.84 0.92 0.87 0.91 
England 7762.60 1.03 0.99 0.96 0.96 1.03 1 
Wales 538.31 0.78 1.05 1.34 1.13 0.93 1.19 
Scotland 1016.79 0.91 1.04 1.14 1.22 0.85 0.94 
Northern 
Ireland 
357.33 0.69 0.72 1.05 1.30 0.56 0.81 
Note : (1) Index numbers below 1 indicate region obtaining grants in excess of that expected given their 
expenditure on the lottery 
Sources : derived from Regional Trends and DCMS (2002a) 
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Table 2 Logan and Queensland Data 
 
1: Region 2 : 
Total  
Commu
nity 
Benefit 
Fund 
Grant 
($m) 
(1994-
2003) 
3 : Index 
of Mean 
Taxable 
Income 
Per Capita 
(Qld =1) 
4 : Index 
of  
Gambling 
Revenue 
per person 
(Qld =1)  
5 : Index 
Adjusted 
for 
relative 
income 
Index of 
Gambling 
Revenue 
per person 
(Qld=1)  
 6 : Index of 
Community 
Benefit Fund 
Grant Per 
person (Qld 
=1) 
7 : 
Index 
of 
Gambli
ng 
Revenu
e 
against 
Comm
unity 
Benefit 
Fund 
Grant  
per 
person) 
(Qld = 
1) 
8 : Index 
of income 
adjusted 
Gambling 
Revenue 
against 
Communi
ty Benefit 
Fund 
Grant  per 
person) 
(Qld = 1) 
Queensland 172.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Logan 6.2 0.94 1.17 1.25 0.76 1.54 1.64 
 
 Logan as Percentage of  Queensland Total 
Mean Taxable Income per capita (1) 93.65 
Population (1) 4.6 
Gambling Revenue (2) 5.4 
Community Benefit Fund Proceeds (2) 3.5 
Note : (1) Office of Economic and Social Research (2003) 
(2) Queensland Office of Gaming Regulation (2003) 
 
